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29 September 1982**RECORD COPY**

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

SUBJECT: 29 September 1982 House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence
(HPSCI) Hearing on Technical Aspects of Strategic Arms Control ☐ 25X1

1. The House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI) convened in H-405, The Capitol, receive testimony on technical aspects of strategic arms control. Representative Albert Gore, Jr., though HPSCI Staffer Leon Fuerth, requested this session. The Committee received a general briefing on this subject on 24 May 1982. ☐ 25X1

2. Members present were: ☐ 25X1

Lee H. Hamilton (D., IN)	Robert McClory (R., IL)
Albert Gore, Jr. (D., TN)	G. W. Whitehurst (R., VA)
Bob Stump (D., AZ)	

3. Present from the Committee were: ☐ 25X1

Thomas K. Latimer, Staff Director	Leon Fuerth
Michael J. O'Neil	Richard H. Giza
James O. Bush	Herbert Romerstein

4. Present from Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) were: ☐ 25X1



Director, Office of Soviet Analysis/DDI 25X1
Soviet Analysis Strategic Forces/DDI
Soviet Analysis Strategic Forces/DDI
Legislative Liaison
Soviet Strategic Weapons Estimates
Office, NSA
Legislative Affairs Office, NSA

5. Because of Mr. Gore's late arrival, Mr. Hamilton reluctantly assumed the mantle of Chairman. After welcoming the witnesses, he asked them to proceed. In his opening remarks, ☐ stated that the purpose of this 25X1 briefing was to review our assessment of Soviet capabilities to reload and refire ICBMs from silos in the event of a nuclear war. Rather than focus on the highly

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technical minutia which can be reviewed in the complete transcript, this memorandum will cover the witnesses general statements as well as questions raised by the Members. []

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6. Among the topics addressed by the witnesses were:

--Storage Facilities of ICBMs-- [] noted that the Soviets would find it difficult to hide a large force of covertly stored missiles from our intelligence sensors. This is due to the fact that these missiles must be stored in highly specialized, distinctive facilities. Commonplace structures, such as garages and warehouses, would not suffice.

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--Reload--We estimate that the reload of a silo using normal complements of crews and specialized ground support equipment could be accomplished in about a day following silo refurbishment, that is, after the silo has been emptied of its old canister and any damage repaired. Refurbishment would take about five hours for the cold launch SS-17 and SS-18, at least two days for hot launch systems like the SS-11 and SS-19. Silo loading, at least for the liquid propellant systems would proceed sequentially. []

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7. In summing up the highly complex data, [] concluded that:

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a. Limited ICBM Reserves are probably available;

b. There is no evidence of plans or preparations for rapidly deploying ICBM's to above ground pads to augment an initial strike;

c. There is clear evidence of plans to undertake reconstitution over the days and weeks following a major nuclear exchange;

d. The Soviets intend to exploit the opportunity afforded by surviving missiles, but we do not think their war plan is dependent upon successfully accomplishing reconstitution. []

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8. In a clumsy effort to ascertain whether this briefing was compiled to reinforce administration policy, Mr. Gore asked what inspired the CIA to review this issue at the current time. [] rejoined that we did not look into this issue when Secretary Weinberger got interested in it, but had written on it before-hand. The first paper on this subject was written in 1979 or 1980. []

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9. Drifting into the policy-making sphere, Mr. Gore asked hypothetically about an agreement between the United States and the Soviet Union in the strategic arms area which would include the preclusion of reconstitution capability. What would you need to see, what kinds of things would be needed in a agreement of that kind? [] observed that this has actually been the subject of some considerable discussion around town in the course of the past few years, not only on the potential and future START agreement, but in the past on the SALT agreements. The distinction was drawn between proposals that are at least negotiable that can be verified by national technical means and those you would most like to have, such as onsite inspections. It is the former set of proposals that are actually discussed. []

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10. In closing the session, Mr. Gore was unusually effusive in praising the witnesses for their excellent presentation. He stated his appreciation for what we do and noted that we do not get any public recognition for it. In response, [] jokingly commented that once in a while we do get a leak. []

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[]
Legislative Liaison

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LLD:JTC:pm (12 November 1982)

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